In his response to my recent article on the TIPNIS conflict in Bolivia, Federico Fuentes characteristically positions himself well to the right of Uruguayan social democrat and prominent political ecologist Eduardo Gudynas.1 For if Gudynas never offers a satisfying critique of capitalism in his analytical interventions on the “new extractivism” of centre-left governments in South America, he does, at a minimum, understand the role played by the Morales regime within the logic of endless accumulation and expansion inherent in the world system as it is currently organised.2 In 2010 and 2011 South America achieved an average growth rate of 6.4 percent, with Paraguay hitting 15 percent, Argentina 9.2 percent and Uruguay 8 percent. After a dip in 2009 Bolivia’s economy picked up again to 4.1 percent in 2010, and grew at 5 percent in the first semester of 2011.
A set of unique regional dynamics in South America over the last decade, related to patterns of accumulation elsewhere in the world market (notably high rates of growth in China), has set off a concerted shift towards the acceleration of mining, oil and gas extraction, and agro-industrial mono-crop cultivation throughout the continent. In other words, the uneven mutations of the ongoing economic crisis on a world scale have not resulted in low growth rates on an aggregate level across South America-at least not yet. Similar to the period normally described as “neoliberal”, massive multinational corporations are deeply imbricated in the extension of extraction at the heart of this primary commodity led growth everywhere in the region. Those cases in which centre-left regimes have entered into joint contracts between state-owned enterprises and multinationals, and negotiated relatively higher royalties and taxes on these extractive activities, are no exception.
Compensatory states
Skimming from the rent generated, many South American governments have established what Gudynas terms “compensatory states”, whose legitimacy rests on the modest redistribution achieved through the priming of often already existing cash-transfer programmes to the extremely poor, without touching the underlying class structure of society. Indeed, the very reproduction of these political economies depends upon states prioritising the maintenance and security of private property rights and juridical environments in which multinationals can profit. Is this what Fuentes means by “regaining sovereign control over vital natural resources and initial steps towards endogenous industrialisation” and “rolling back the neoliberal project in Bolivia”?
Because the legitimacy function of relatively petty handouts runs on the blood of extraction, the compensatory state increasingly becomes a repressive state, on behalf of capital, as the expansion of extraction necessarily accelerates what David Harvey calls accumulation by dispossession, and the variegated forms of resistance it regularly spawns.3 In the representative case of the TIPNIS in Bolivia, the steamrolling of the rights to self-governance of indigenous communities resisting highway construction through their territory illustrates the coercive wing of the compensatory state in action-somehow, though, I’ve missed, according to Fuentes, the ways in which Morales has established and protected novel “forms of self-government by indigenous communities”. Indigenous self-government in Bolivia is to be defended by Morales, it would seem, only when the claims are to territories marginal to the state’s development project.
The compensatory state co-opts and coerces in response to such signs of opposition, and builds an accompanying ideological apparatus to defend multinationals-an ideology in which communities of resistance are vilified as internal enemies acting in concert with the interests, or even in the pay, of various instruments of imperialism. The discursive gestures of state officials, of course, safely set to one side the obvious imperial character of the dispossessing activities of multinational corporations-now called “partners” rather than “bosses” in development-within the matrix of the new extractivism. Fuentes is, within the relatively small English language world of the international far left, an important functionary on behalf of this ideological production. As such, he is one of very few leftist intellectuals knowledgeable about Bolivian dynamics who persist enthusiastically in citing the recent musings of the country’s vice-president Álvaro García Linera as if they were credible analytical outputs.4
The people, social class and imperialism
One pillar of this theoretical point of departure is the subsuming of social class within the category of “the people”, the latter, in turn, finding its unproblematic expression in the Morales government. “Whether we, like García Linera, regard the TIPNIS controversy [in Bolivia] as a conflict within the people,” Fuentes concludes, “or like Webber take sides against the Bolivian government in this matter, we must not fail to oppose the intrusion of imperialist governments and agencies into the internal affairs of the Bolivian people”.5
Because Fuentes proceeds without any conceptualisation of the specificity of capitalist social relations, or any rootedness in the history of Marxist engagement with the question of the peasantry, he doesn’t see anything novel about intensifying class stratification and the effect it has had on the unfolding dynamics of the TIPNIS conflict. For Fuentes, its rhythms, logic and dynamics are mysteriously incomprehensible and utterly contingent. Out of this confusion emerge astonishingly ahistorical claims about the basically unchanging character of rural life across millennia and different modes of production, and an absurd charge that my entire analysis rests on crudely moralistic foundations: “One of the most questionable aspects of Webber’s piece is his effort to divide indigenous movements between ‘good’ ones [his words, not mine], which he says are ‘non-capitalist’ communities6 waging class war…and ‘bad’ ones [again, his words] allied with the MAS.” For Fuentes, “peasant populations have always, everywhere, been stratified along class and income lines”, so it is safe to ignore entirely my summary of changes in the country’s agrarian relations over the last several decades, which indicates, among other things, an acceleration of what Marx called primitive accumulation during the neoliberal epoch that has not stalled under Morales. It’s best not to try to understand the complexity of social relations driving the TIPNIS conflict at different scales-local, regional, nation-state and international-but rather to defer to the government and its defence of “the people”.
Another strange absence recurs throughout Fuentes’ text-the hierarchical world market and multinational capitals in his thinking on imperialism. To select one especially telling example, readers of his critique will have been interested to learn that the imperatives of the world market have no bearing on prices of natural gas produced in the country, and multinationals operating in the country simply take orders from the Bolivian government: “While transnationals technically extract the majority of Bolivia’s gas, they do so as contractors hired by the state, which determines the quantity and the price of every single drop of Bolivian gas that is produced”.7 The only agents worth considering in Fuentes’ understanding of imperialism are the multifaceted tentacles of the US state. I’m charged, here as elsewhere, with “overlook[ing] the real role of the Santa Cruz oligarchy and US imperialism”.8
From the other sides of the analysis, the only anti-imperialist agent of note, it appears, is the Bolivian state, which, again, embodies the people insofar as significant parts of it are under the control of Morales’s party, the Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement Towards Socialism, MAS). From these first principles, then, Fuentes rules out the possibility that the indigenous communities of resistance in the TIPNIS are themselves on the front line of anti-imperial struggle in direct confrontation with extractive capital, the property and investment rights of which are being protected by the Bolivian state, not out of an “error” committed by the MAS government, but rather because its political economy depends on this capital for its very reproduction. He also rules out the possibility of the complexity of a situation in which the Bolivian state sometimes finds itself simultaneously acting as partial antagonist vis−á−vis the US state, and facilitator vis−á−vis different multinational capitals and other imperial and sub-imperial states. These are elementary points made by many critical observers of Bolivia’s intensifying extractive sectors. But they won’t be unearthed in the pamphlets of García Linera.
The new extractivism in Bolivia
The logic of the new extractivism has its particular expressions in the Bolivian case, most of which are made entirely invisible through the analytical prism adopted by Fuentes. In terms of natural gas extraction, it pays to remember that in the first administration of Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (1993-7) the Bolivian state attempted to extend the area designated for gas exploration and exploitation to approximately 13 million hectares. When this initiative was defeated through indigenous resistance in different areas of the Amazon, the multinational petroleum corporations were forced to concentrate on their mega-gasfields in the south of the country, above all in the department of Tarija. At the end of 2011, however, Morales had taken up the defeated mantle of Sánchez de Lozada, and proposed the extension of gas exploration and exploitation to roughly 12 million hectares-an area four times as great as that in 2009. Of this area, close to 50 percent was conceded entirely to multinationals. New government measures introduced in 2012 will likely amplify this area significantly, bringing the level of extraction of gas in the country to unprecedented levels.9
Likewise, in mining, spokespeople for the Morales government have announced initiatives for the large-scale expansion of mining activities beyond those in the traditional zones of the altiplano, or western high plateau, where mining has been under way since the colonial era. Much of this new mining will involve opening new frontiers into the Amazon.10
Similar to other cases of dispossession from Mexico to Chile, the geographies being encroached upon in Bolivia for extending gas and mineral extraction, together with the growth of agro-industrial production (the majority of which is soya production under the control of Brazilian capital), include protected areas of biodiversity and indigenous territories which are currently among the last regions of the country relatively free of industrial and commercial activity, and which are, at the moment, governed by ecologically sustainable economies. It is the logic of accumulation by dispossession at the heart of this tripartite process-mining, gas and agro-industry-that has generated the TIPNIS conflict, and which is likely to generate many more social conflicts into the future. It used to be the case that the theoreticians of the Latin American left opposed enclave economies ruled by the interests of multinational capital, and argued instead for building paths towards socialist revolution; but today the likes of Fuentes are dangerously reversing this axiomatic point of departure, accepting as the parameters of transformation the crumbs dispensed by a compensatory state, which in Fuentes’ vision of the world appears capable of regulating capitalism, a mode of production that can be benevolent if only the government is on the side of “the people”.
Agrarian reform?
In challenging my characterisation of the extreme limits of agrarian reform under Morales, Fuentes poses a rhetorical question: “Is it ‘inconsequential’ that in its first five years the Morales government presided over the redistribution or titling of 91 million hectares of land to over 900,000 members of indigenous peasant communities?” And, elsewhere in his critique Fuentes claims that “over 35 million hectares of land has been handed [sic] as communitarian property or placed under the direct control of the original indigenous inhabitants”.
Now, it is undoubtedly true that with the election of the MAS in December 2005 land reform was placed squarely back on the political agenda by the social movements. The debate around agrarian reform and what form it would take was among the most heated components of political life in the first few months of Morales’s first administration. Rumours and threats proliferated, with various right wing, large landowners’ organisations rooted in the lowland departments of Santa Cruz, Pando and Beni even threatening to take up arms against the state in response to any state initiative that might impinge upon their property rights.
According to the MAS government, there were three legitimate agrarian sectors that deserved state support: (i) large-scale agro-industrial exporters; (ii) small-scale family peasant production, partially for the market and partially for subsistence; and (iii) communal indigenous landholdings. The government’s contention was that a certain harmonious balance, or virtuous circle of mutual benefit, could be maintained across these different sectors, rather than there being an inherently conflict-ridden class antagonism structured into their competing interests.11 This position has been essentially maintained throughout both administrations of the Morales regime to date, as expressed in the Plan Nacional de Desarrollo.
For the MAS government, the construction of a new model of agrarian development signifies a commitment to a “plural and diverse” agricultural economy, with state, communitarian, cooperative and capitalist forms of social property relations coexisting alongside one another. However, the plural economy, from the government’s perspective, can only act as the basis for a sustainable and integrated model of rural development if it prioritises the strengthening of the economic, technical and institutional capacities of those social groups historically subject to social and economic exclusion: indigenous communities, peasants and the landless.12 By 2010 the Ministry of Rural Development and Land claimed that the distribution of rural properties undertaken to that point had already achieved a “communitarian renewal of agrarian reform” and in a short while would achieve “an equitable and inclusive structure for all economic actors”, which would result in “practically two thirds of the national territory being in the hands of the country’s majority, with the state having control of a half of the remaining third part of the national territory, and the sector of individual property owners linked to agro-industrial activity having access to the other half of the last third”.13 The notion of a conflict-free, plural agrarian economy appears in the new constitution as well as in the two major pieces of legislation introduced by the government to address agrarian reform-the Ley de Reconducción Comunitaria de la Reforma Agraria (Law for the Communitarian Renewal of Agrarian Reform, LRCRA) passed in late 2006, and the Ley de la Revolución Productiva Comunitaria Agropecuaria (Law of Productive Communitarian Agricultural Revolution, LRPCA), passed in 2011.
If this is the transformative discursive apparatus of the government’s agrarian policy framework, in practice the continuities with neoliberalism in the implementation of such legislation have been rather sharper than any ruptures. Indeed, a pattern of reconstituted neoliberalism has been quite decisively demonstrated in the most detailed report on the political economy of the Bolivian countryside under Morales available to date, Control Ciudadano’s Reconducción comunitaria de la reforma agraria y producción agrícola, published in March 2012. Putting it mildly, it offers an interesting contrast to García Linera’s inflated account of agrarian reform on which Fuentes, as in other areas of his analysis, relies heavily.
Of the many insights in this report, I’ll indicate but two. First, empirical trends in crop production demonstrate that the neoliberal export-oriented model of agrarian capitalism-initiated in earnest in the late 1980s, rooted in large-scale agro-industrial enterprises and geographically situated in Santa Cruz-has been consolidated rather than overturned under the MAS administration. Small-scale peasant production has continued to lose relevance. The LRCRA amounted to little more than the introduction of a select number of modest reforms to the neoliberal INRA law of 1996, and it was designed to better operationalise its predecessor rather than to undo its underlying logic. Crop patterns are one indication of continuity. Since the mid-1990s the aggregate trend in agricultural production in Bolivia has been slow and moderate expansion. The slow but relatively steady uptick in agricultural production can be explained essentially through the growth of four specific industrial crops: sugar cane, soya, corn and sorghum. If these four crops are removed from the equation, agricultural production has been in a transparent process of stagnation.14 During the government of the MAS crops that are usually catalogued as industrial-because they undergo some level of manufacturing or industrial processing in
preparation for human or animal consumption and are produced, by and large, under capitalist relations of production-account for the bulk of agricultural production in the country (79.1 percent in the 2005-6 agricultural season, and 80.4 percent in 2010-11). Moreover, two export-driven crops alone-soya (40 percent) and sugar cane (36 percent)-account for 76 percent of the total growth in volume of production between 2005 and 2011.15 On the other hand, the portion of overall agricultural production of those crops in which peasant production continues to be important (fruit, vegetables, tubers and fodder) has trended toward irrelevance.16
Second, to return for a moment to the passage from the Ministry of Rural Development and Land quoted above, it may be close to true that soon roughly two thirds of the national territory will be formally in the hands of the indigenous peasantry of the country. This tells us nothing of the quality of the land they will control, however. Nor does it tell us anything relevant about the third of the territory that will remain in the hands of the medium and large agro-industrial firms. This third, in reality, constitutes the best lands for agricultural production and ranching in the country. Because, as the report demonstrates in exhaustive detail, the MAS government has not touched their monopolisation of this territory and has no plans to do so, the alleged “equality” of distribution in the plural economy will not translate into “equality” of quality lands.17
Conclusion
Even those Marxists like Emiliano López and Francisco Vértiz, who insist on emphasising the differences between at least three emergent national development models in Latin America since the regional crisis of neoliberalism began in the late 1990s,18 recognise that in the current world conjuncture, above and beyond their differences, each of these three models fall into line with a “new international consensus” which assigns Latin America to the role of exporting natural resources. Such an insertion in the world market restores, if in novel ways, the role the region played historically in the geopolitical order at an international level.19
More interestingly still, we need to seriously entertain the hypothesis, recently advanced by José Seoane and Clara Algramati, that the particular logic of expression of the global crisis in the periphery of the world system is a radical deepening of processes of accumulation by dispossession.20 That is to say, more specifically, between 2008 and 2011 we have witnessed a new cycle of commodification, appropriation, and assertion of control on the part of large capitals of a series of collective goods across the global periphery, but especially the commodification and appropriation of the common goods of nature. According to Seoane and Algramati there is still a direly insufficient consciousness of the scale and magnitude of this offensive, as well as the forces behind it. Reflecting on the trends of foreign direct investment (FDI) into Latin America since the world crisis began to unfold in 2008, we can at least begin to understand the necessity of further exploration of the issue. With the exception of 2009, when aggregate GDP across Latin America and the Caribbean momentarily dipped, the period between 2008 and 2011 witnessed record volumes of FDI coming into the region-depending on the year, an increase of between 70 and 130 percent compared to the average levels obtained between 2000 and 2005.
In the mining sector FDI in 2011 reached a record high of approximately US$140 billion, a 40 percent increase on the figure for 2010 (already a massive year) and a 250 percent increase on the volume registered in 2003.21 Seoane and Algramati stress the fact that, regardless of variations in political ideologies, most governments in the region appear intent on deepening this model, and justifying it through the suggestion that it is a logical response to the instability of the global economy, the deceleration of growth on a global scale, and the possible impacts upon public budgets and trade balances, pillars of the preceding economic cycle. This relative commonality, furthermore, finds expression in projects such as the Initiative for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America (IIRSA), the supreme importance of which Fuentes cannot seem to understand.22 IIRSA needs to be understood, according to Seoane and Algramati, in the context of this intensification of accumulation by dispossession in the areas of mining, gas and agro-industry throughout the region. The priority of this public infrastructural project of regional integration is to facilitate the commercial export of raw commodities. IIRSA is, therefore, yet another expression of the increasing hegemony of the extractivist-export model of development, even if it is today cloaked in an ideological guise of neo-developmentalism and growing trade with China rather than the US.
In the face of this extractivist offensive, there has been a veritable wave of protest and social resistance emerging and developing at a regional level. A vast number of movements and struggles are calling into question the extractivist-export model and its attendant violence, looting, environmental devastation and recolonisation in the form of multinational capital’s power.23 At the close of 2010, for example, one conservative estimate suggested at least 155 active mining conflicts across the region.24
This is the wider imperial logic that needs to be understood in order to grasp its specific manifestations on a local scale in the context of TIPNIS. Discerning the players on all sides, and their descending relations of importance, is obviously a difficult and complex matter of investigation. But Fuentes’ response has taught us, at least, the path our analysis should avoid if we want a minimum of clarity regarding contemporary Bolivian dynamics.
Notes
1: Fuentes, 2012, responding to Webber, 2012.
2: Gudynas, 2012.
3: Geographer David Harvey’s concept of accumulation by dispossession is an elaboration of Marx’s “primitive accumulation”. Marx writes of those epoch-making “moments when great masses of men are suddenly and forcibly torn from their means of subsistence, and hurled onto the labour market as free, unprotected and rightless proletarians. The expropriation of the agricultural producer, of the peasant from the soil, is the basis of the whole process. The history of this expropriation assumes different aspects in different countries, and runs through its various phases in different orders of succession, and at different historical epochs.” See Marx, 1977. For Harvey, Marx rightly highlighted these processes of capital accumulation “based upon predation, fraud, and violence”, but incorrectly imagined them to be exclusively features of a “primitive” or “original” stage of capitalism. With the concept of accumulation by dispossession, Harvey wants to point rather to the continuity of predatory practices that have risen dramatically to the surface once again in the era of neoliberalism. See Harvey, 2003, p144.
4: See, in particular, García Linera, 2011. The recent work of García Linera needs to be distinguished from his often luminescent writings of the late 1990s and early 2000s. Again, consistent with the rest of Fuentes’ work on Bolivia, in his critique of my TIPNIS article one will struggle in vain to find a source cited by Fuentes on the ostensible “advances” of the “process of change” that isn’t directly linked to the government itself or to journalists (in this case Stefanoni) with a long and well-known connection to official sources. Stefanoni is a close friend of Álvaro García Linera and his frequent collaborator on books and articles on Bolivian politics.
5: One nefarious implication here, obviously, is that unlike Fuentes I am not really against imperialism because I also speak of class contradictions within Bolivia. It is worthwhile to reiterate here the opposition to this perspective I offered in the original article: “The implied lesson here-it is not sufficient for activists and intellectuals in the Global North to condemn and fight the imperialism of our governments; we must also close our eyes to contradiction, shut our mouths, and play the role of Evo’s loyal soldiers abroad. International working class solidarity, on this view, means parroting the communiqués of the presidential palace in La Paz and aligning ourselves with Bolivian embassies in our countries. The palace and the embassy almost become the Bolivian masses. We must observe a stern silence as regards explosions of independent working class, peasant and indigenous resistance against the impositions of a reconstituted neoliberalism in Bolivia. Better still, when faced with a struggle like that in TIPNIS, we ought to tip our hats to their legitimate demands, while portraying the movement as largely a by-product of ‘green imperialism’. The endogenous linear developmentalism of García Linera’s Andean-Amazonian strategy-a veritable green light for the steamrolling of TIPNIS-is magically eclipsed in this view.”
6: It would be interesting to know if Fuentes would challenge the empirical basis of what I argue, precisely: “On the other side, that is in TIPNIS to the North, we encounter the largely non-capitalist social relations of the Mojeños-Trinitarios, Chimanes, and Yuracarés-that is, communities based on collective self-reproduction through small-scale agricultural activities, the extraction of forest resources, and artisanal production.” Fuentes may be conflicted here, as my argument draws on the empirical evidence of a book on the TIPNIS written by Pablo Stefanoni and Álvaro García Linera, before the latter became vice-president.
7: For a realistic account of the gas sector and the role of multinationals therein, see Fernández Terán, 2012.
8: For a more extensive refutation of Fuentes’ consistent manipulation and simplification of my arguments, as well as his radically reductionist treatment of imperialism in the current period, see our exchange in International Socialist Review, Fuentes, 2011, and Webber, 2011.
9: Gandarillas Gonzales, 2012, pp29-31.
10: Gandarillas Gonzales, 2012, p30.
11: See La Prensa, 17 May 2006.
12: MDRAyMA, 2007, p19.
13: Quoted in Control Ciudadano, 2012, p12.
14: Control Ciudadano, 2012, pp2-3.
15: Control Ciudadano, 2012, p5.
16: Control Ciudadano, 2012, p3.
17: Control Ciudadano, 2012, p13.
18: The first of these, according to this account, is that which maintains a clear continuity with the policies associated with the neoliberal ideal. In this group we encounter Mexico, Chile, Perú, Colombia and large chunks of Central America. A second group of countries-which principally includes Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay-is that which has adopted a national-popular rhetoric directed against international financial capital and certain domestic oligarchic sectors. In embracing such rhetorical positions, these countries have distanced themselves from the neoliberalism of the 1990s. Lastly, there are those countries-Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela-with transitional projects. In this category the rhetoric of anti-neoliberalism and anti-imperialism is more pronounced, and the positive position advanced by these governments is potentially anti-systemic.
19: López and Vértiz, 2012.
20: Seoane and Algramati, 2012.
21: Seoane and Algramati, 2012.
22: IIRSA was launched in 2000 with the participation of 12 of South America’s governments at the time. Brazil took the lead from the beginning in the initiative’s planning and financing. With a current budget of just under US$1 trillion, the vision is to increase access to remote regions of South America and to spike energy-generation capacity through the construction of highways, railways, bridges, seaports and waterways-see Friedman Rudovsky, 2012. I briefly discuss the role of Brazilian sub-imperialism acting in and through IIRSA in the original article to which Fuentes is responding.
23: Seoane and Algramati, 2012.
24: Delgado Ramos, 2012, p4.
References
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