Resisting Israel’s endless wars on Lebanon

Israel is systematically destroying southern Lebanon. Christian, Shia and Sunni villages alike have been emptied under bombardment; nearly one third of the population has fled.1 This is Israel’s second war on Lebanon in two years, and one of the most devastating.2 Israeli troops happily film themselves abusing Christian icons, burning mosques and destroying centuries-old monasteries. Soldiers have looted homes, ripped up thousand-year-old olive trees and destroyed hundreds of small-scale workshops across a vital farming region. Geography—not religious sect—determines what survives and what becomes rubble. This is the “Gaza Doctrine” on full display, executed without fear of sanctions.

The war has cost Lebanon over £20 billion—exceeding the country’s gross domestic product (GDP)—with the economy projected to contract by 7 percent this year, deepening a collapse that began with the 2019 financial crisis. As of May 2026, the death toll has climbed to above 3,500 people, with many thousands more injured.3 The war is also poisoning the land itself. Phosphorus munitions, defoliants and heavy metals have contaminated some 55,000 acres across Lebanon’s forests, farmland and river valleys.4

For the United States and its Israeli ally, this war is a huge gamble. The attack on Iran, which started in February 2026, is central to Israel’s bid for regional dominance. As part of this, Israel opened a second front in Lebanon, expecting a quick victory. However, the war has run off the rails. Iran is emerging stronger than before, while the Lebanese resistance has proved more resilient than anticipated. Israeli strategists increasingly fear a long war of attrition, with the military warning that it cannot realistically hold on to the south of the country.5 For both the US and Israel, the danger is that Lebanon once again becomes a quagmire—one that destabilises the very Lebanese state Washington has spent years trying to build.

Hezbollah survives the 2024 war

The assassination of Hezbollah’s secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah in 2024 dealt the organisation a devastating blow. Yet, it survived. Weapons routes through Syria reopened, domestic weapons production expanded and Israeli troops now face relentless Ukraine-style drone attacks.6 Alongside Hezbollah’s armed resistance, civilian networks are mobilising people across the country.7 This so-called “army of ants” now shelters, feeds and protects over one million displaced people.8

Until now, the US has focused on building up the institutions of the Lebanese state in order to enable it to disarm the resistance. Lebanon’s pro-Western government outlawed Hezbollah’s military activities, expelled the Iranian ambassador, and banned public broadcasters from using the term “the Israeli enemy” and from referring to Hezbollah as “the resistance”.9 Alongside this, it is targeting the organisation’s financial networks and cracking down on remittances—measures that also threaten tens of thousands of people left destitute by the war.10 Lebanese ministers met Israeli officials to discuss the terms for a separate peace, while Israeli warplanes bombed the country. The government rejected the Iranian demand that Lebanon should be included in any regional ceasefire agreement.11 This position has left both the Lebanese government and its US backers exposed. Opposition to disarming Hezbollah is growing—not only among civilians but also inside the Lebanese army itself.12 Officers circulated letters warning against any confrontation with Hezbollah and refused US pressure to attend peace talks with Israeli commanders.13

Back into the killing fields

Israel’s present war echoes its 1982-2000 occupation of Lebanon in striking ways: the security zone along the border; the overwhelming use of airpower, massacres and terror; a Lebanese government desperate to make a deal; and the role of Western powers in putting pressure on Lebanon to follow Jordan and Egypt in recognising Israel and hence abandoning Palestine. Israel’s 1982 invasion swept through south Lebanon before surrounding Beirut and forcing the surrender of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO). By the end of the year, Israel occupied one third of the country, some 3,500 km². The US negotiated Lebanon’s terms of surrender, known as the 17 May 1983 Agreement.14 The treaty linked Israeli withdrawal to a security zone and the de facto recognition of the state of Israel. The newly reorganised Lebanese army would disarm what remained of the Palestinian fighters and disband Lebanese opposition groups. The deal, signed by then president Amin Gemayel, the leader of the pro-Israeli Lebanese Forces—a sectarian Christian militia—was supposed to mark the total defeat of the Palestinian and Lebanese revolutions.

US and French troops set up bases in Beirut to enforce the agreement. However, Israel’s victory was short-lived. Over the next three years, Israeli forces were pushed back, in some cases through agreement with sections of the Lebanese army, but more often at the hands of a popular resistance that began to recover and reorganise. In October 1983, Hezbollah drove two truck bombs into US and French barracks, killing 241 American and 58 French troops. The attack put an end to the Western military presence. Similar attacks in the southern city of Tyre decimated the Israeli headquarters. Across the south, pinprick attacks, local uprisings and a grassroots resistance began to wear down the occupation.

An uprising in the Shia-majority city of Nabatieh set off a chain of events culminating in the February 1984 Intifada.15 At the same time, attempts by the Lebanese army to suppress West Beirut and its southern districts only widened the rebellion. Despite heavy bombing by US warships anchored off the coast, the uprising spread to the mountains. Lebanese troops sent into battle switched sides. The pro-Western government fell shortly after. In the wake of February 1984, left-wing and Arab nationalist groups formed the National Resistance Front (Jammoul), bringing together communists, Arab nationalists and Amal, a mainstream Shia movement headed by Nabih Berri, the current speaker of the Lebanese Parliament.16 Hezbollah emerged out of this uprising, first as a split from the more conservative Amal movement, then as its chief rival.

The uprising faced an entrenched enemy behind the front lines. The Amal movement, supported by Syrian troops, took the opportunity to sweep away the left and laid siege to the Sabra and Chatila refugee camps, the heart of the Palestinian revolution in Lebanon. Syria then drove remnants of the PLO from the northern city of Tripoli.17 Amal later fought an unsuccessful war against Hezbollah, which split the Shia community. Hezbollah survived, consolidated Iranian backing and emerged as the dominant force within the Lebanese resistance movement.18 It found growing support in the southern villages, some sections of south Beirut and the vast agricultural Bekaa Valley, consolidating its presence through an effective guerrilla war that lasted 18 years. In early
June 1999, Hezbollah, alongside the Resistance Brigades—groups of volunteers from across Lebanon’s many religious sects—pushed the South Lebanese Army (SLA), an Israeli proxy militia, out of large areas of the south. A year later, a strike by university students triggered a general uprising in the south. Large crowds broke open Israeli prison camps, disarmed the collaborators and chased Israeli troops across the border. Israel’s 1982 war ended in failure.19

Resistance and revolution

Combining resistance with mass movements is a key lesson of Israel’s defeat. As for Hezbollah, part of its appeal lay in its claim to represent the “oppressed”. However, rather than overturning Lebanon’s sectarian order, the organisation increasingly sought a greater share within it. Over time, Hezbollah became integrated into the very confessional system it once claimed to oppose.20 Its victory over Israel in the following 2006 war accelerated that process.21 Moreover, Hezbollah defended the Lebanese sectarian order during the 2019 October Revolution, just as it had helped suppress Syria’s popular revolt after 2012.22 A growing middle class came to dominate the party. Hezbollah entered parliament, expanded its institutional power and became increasingly integrated into the state.23 This compromise had a deeper weakness: Hezbollah’s growing dependence on Iranian patronage tied to regional calculations, the so-called Axis of Resistance. Today, the survival of the organisation depends on whether Iran manages to include Lebanon in any future settlement with the US.

Despite these terrible mistakes, ordinary people rallied around Hezbollah, and many of the networks that grew out of the 2019 October Revolution form a vital part of the civilian resistance, stepping into the vacuum left by the state. Yet, being a mere cheerleader for Hezbollah or armed resistance in general will not challenge the existing order. Lebanon’s history proves that resistance becomes strongest when it fuses with broader struggles for social change. The system that stole people’s savings, that imposed cruel austerity, that makes the very prospect of advancement, or even basic survival, dependent on sectarian loyalty is now prepared to trade off one third of the country in a deal with Western imperialism.

Class, sect and the struggle for change

Lebanon is often defined by sectarian affiliation, yet class has become more important since the end of the civil war in 1990—and the class struggle has become much sharper in the wake of the 2019 economic meltdown. The banking secrecy laws, modelled on Switzerland, promoted unregulated and secret accounts to make Beirut an attractive hub for the circulation of capital.24 This proved to be a mirage. The rise of Gulf oil states sidelined Lebanese banks. Crucially, the banking sector’s inability to adapt left it open to Ponzi schemes that would end in one of the biggest collapses in economic history. The 2019 financial crash tore the economy apart. The GDP plummeted by 58.1 percent, and the Lebanese Lira (LL), which had been pegged to the US dollar for two decades, collapsed. Banks no longer had enough dollars to pay depositors, so they shut their doors. The national debt skyrocketed to 495 percent of GDP.

The collapse of the “bankers’ republic” stripped the country to its bare capitalist realities, dividing it between the immiserated masses and the “sect of money”. Lebanon is home to 1,780 millionaires worth some £55.4 billion and six billionaires with a combined wealth of £9.15 billion.25 By comparison, the GDP for 2024 was £14.9 billion.26 The domestic capitalist class, which owes its power to confessional distribution of privilege, is integrated economically, politically and socially. For example, a study of the companies dominating the concrete industry found a high integration of interests between leading figures as diverse as far-right Christian militias, the traditional Sunni Muslim bourgeoisie and families that dominate “progressive” political parties.27 Yet, the Lebanese political system distributes power by sect. The presidency is reserved for a Maronite Christian, the premiership for a Sunni Muslim and the speakership for a Shia Muslim. Civil service posts, military appointments and ministries follow the same logic.28 Social mobility is dictated by sectarian identity—ruling families (often former militia leaders) monopolise power that they distribute within their own sect, often building parallel welfare institutions. Frequently, rivalries between sectarian leaders spill into street clashes. Despite these spurts of violence, the ruling class remains economically united, just as poverty and inequality cut across sectarian identity.

Much has changed since France carved Lebanon out of geographic Syria (Bilad al-Sham) in 1926 and introduced the National Pact, which set in stone the confessional distribution of power, in 1943.29 The pact locked the political superstructure into a demographic that no longer exists. Citizens register to vote in their village of origin according to sectarian allocation, despite generations living in Beirut and other cities. The urban population has grown since the only census taken in 1932. In fact, since the 1960s, the country has been transformed from a primarily village economy with pockets of industry to one of the most urbanised in the world, with 92 percent of the population living in cities. This has been caused by waves of internal migration driven by shifts in land ownership, repeated cycles of war and economic crisis.30 This urbanisation has undermined the insular segregation of village life, while the political superstructure remains ossified and unable to adapt to social changes.31 Today, nearly one in five marriages registered in Lebanon are inter-faith—between Christian sects, across Muslim sects, and between Muslims and Christians.32 Many workplaces, including schools and post offices, are mixed, especially in Beirut. This point of contact, where workers are defined by their job rather than sect, has shaped the country’s modern politics.

The past 30 years have produced profound periods of social convulsions.33 The 1990s were marked by a rising tide of workers’ struggles, culminating in three general strikes between 2004 and 2007.34 Moreover, workers have a rich history of fighting off attempts by sectarian gangs to break up strikes.35 The 2019 October Revolution remains a testimony to this shift. Protests broke out across towns and cities irrespective of their sectarian makeup. The slogans “All of Them, Means All of Them!” and “All of Us, Means All of Us!” became the clearest class expressions of this change.36

Lebanon’s class structure has undergone further transformation since the 2019 financial collapse. The middle class, once comprising 35 percent of the population, has shrunk by half. The sectarian system gives preference to sections of the middle classes and some better-off workers over others. Today, however, a teacher’s pension is equally worthless, whether they taught in a Christian school in the mountains overlooking Beirut or a dusty shack in the Muslim area of the Bekaa Valley. Their savings, locked into depreciating Lebanese currency, have lost 98 percent of their value.37 Instead of being divided by sect, there is a growing gap between the “dollarised” rich receiving remittances from abroad, or working for international companies, and the “Lira” poor—public sector employees, soldiers, teachers and retirees whose pensions have eroded. More than four-fifths of the population lack access to healthcare, electricity and education. Extreme poverty has risen to nearly 40 percent.38 Alongside the shrinking middle class and pauperised working class are the secondary class non-citizens that face systematic exclusion and exploitation. There are half a million Palestinian refugees who face restrictions on employment and the right to own property; Syrians (over 1.5 million) are locked out by employment laws; and migrant workers, many from African and South and South-East Asian countries, are employed under the hyper exploitative Kafala (sponsorship) system.39

Beirut’s neighbourhoods are a mix of segregated enclaves and diverse pockets. Although the barricades of the 1975-90 civil war are gone, the demographic divide largely remains, separating the city into a predominantly Christian East and a predominantly Muslim West. Upscale and traditional middle-class neighbourhoods remain defined by sect, but working-class areas have become mixed, often by necessity. In districts such as Sabra and Shatila (West Beirut) and Bourj Hammoud (East Beirut), known as “the belt of misery”, workers of diverse Lebanese backgrounds live next to refugees and migrant workers.

Playing the sectarian card

After trying to defeat the resistance, the state, facing deep hostility, has reached for the sectarian card. Key to this is pitting Christians against Shia Muslims and, crucially, stoking Sunni-Shia sectarianism. There have been successes,
especially in some Beirut neighborhoods and the northern city of Tripoli, and overt sectarian rhetoric has once again become mainstream. Part of this “divide and rule” strategy relies on the transitional Syrian regime under Ahmed al-Sharaa.

Al-Sharaa, a Sunni Muslim, has exploited Hezbollah’s role in suppressing the Syrian Revolution to pose as a new sponsor of Lebanon’s Sunnis. Yet, this strategy has deep flaws. Al-Sharaa has failed to win any concessions from Israel over the land seized in December 2024. Palestinians—the majority of whom are Sunni Muslims—remain deeply hostile to Israel. Syria, irrespective of which regime is in control, has long played a dual role in Lebanon’s history, at times backing resistance movements, at other times shoring up the sectarian system whenever popular movements threatened it. Lebanese officials increasingly point to Syria’s reintegration into the world economy and rapprochement with Gulf states as a model for Lebanon itself. However, the new Syria has little to show for its cooperation, and the country is unlikely to stabilise as long as the genocide in Palestine continues.

Recently, Al-Sharaa toured European capitals seeking support for his new government and relief from sanctions. Yet, after Israel passed a law authorising the execution of Palestinian prisoners, mass protests erupted across Syria, including inside the Aleppo barracks. These were some of the largest protests since the fall of Bashar Al-Assad’s regime. More dangerously for al-Sharaa, tribes in the south declared war on Israel, while thousands of Syrians attempted to storm Israeli-held areas before local forces pulled them back. Any rapprochement between Syrian and Israel faces another obstacle: Israel’s refusal to withdraw from newly occupied Syrian lands and repeated threats to attack government troops who are deployed south of Damascus. With the Israeli army now camped some 26 km from the Syrian capital, any unilateral deal between Lebanon and Israel leaves Syria dangerously isolated. What is more, Israel is facing an arc of Sunni resistance that stretches from Syria’s southern border into Lebanon. Saida, Lebanon’s southern capital, has a long history of Lebanese-Palestinian integration. The city, which is 80 percent Sunni, is the traditional stronghold of Arab nationalist parties and home to Ain al-Hilweh, the largest Palestinian camp.40 Any movement that can appeal across the sectarian faultlines will pose a long-term threat to Israel’s ambitions.41

Never in its history has the Lebanese working class been so integrated by generalised crisis and shared collective interest, not only against the Israeli enemy but also against the Lebanese ruling class itself. This makes it more amenable to genuine revolutionary change. In turn, the resistance can only win if it becomes part of a broader movement for social change. Hezbollah has fallen well short of this, and is paying the price for its compromises. It should be clear that the struggle against imperialism and Lebanon’s quisling government are intertwined. The same state that destroyed people’s savings now asks them to surrender the south. For growing numbers of Lebanese, these are no longer separate struggles. The solidarity movement has shown what is possible. The immediate task of the Lebanese left is to build organisations that can unite these struggles into a wider project for revolutionary change.

Simon Assaf is a Lebanese revolutionary socialist based in London. He is commissioning editor for Beirut-based magazine The Public Source.

Notes